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China and Southeast Asia1
Odd Arne Westad
The most remarkable aspect of China’s international development over the past thirty years has been its re-engagement with Southeast Asia. Until three decades ago China laboured 
under a self-imposed exile from the continent of which it is a part. In the early 1980s China 
had just fought a war with Vietnam, in which it lost at least 20,000 soldiers, and the other 
Southeast Asian states understandably viewed China with suspicion. India, along China’s 
south-western frontier, was politically close to the Soviet Union and had regarded China as 
a diehard enemy since the 1962 war. It was an Asian world that seemed to have expurgated 
China from its midst. The central kingdom was no longer central, but distinctly peripheral to 
the rest of the continent.
Now look at the situation today. A most striking change in China’s foreign relations has taken place 
to its south. In spite of their differences over the division lines in the South China Sea, the Southeast 
Asian countries are today closer to China than they have been for at least a hundred years. Vietnam is 
a case in point.
NORMALISING RELATIONS
China’s most recent border war was with Vietnam, a country Maoist China had supported in its struggles 
for reunification against France and the United States. The 1979 war left deep scars in China. To most 
Chinese, its course demonstrated Vietnamese ingratitude, Soviet perfidy, and Chinese military weakness 
all in one. I visited the border areas not long after the war ended, and the shock was palpable. It was 
no secret to local people that China had lost the war, or at least not won it. 
Chinese diplomatic ineptitude had brought about the brief but disastrous Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979. 
Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s, the Maoists had supported the radical Cambodian faction, the 
Khmer Rouge, especially after it took power in 1975 and introduced a Maoist-type state. When the 
Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot repeatedly attacked Vietnamese territory, Beijing stuck by him because of 
its concerns over Hanoi’s increasingly close relationship with the Soviets. 
Throughout the 1980s China and Vietnam carried out a war by proxy in Cambodia, with Vietnamese 
troops keeping a new government in place in Phnom Pen. China continued to support the Khmer Rouge, 
despite the former regime ‘s claim to lasting infamy being that it carried the only known genocide against 
its own population. Although China was not the only country that supported directly or indirectly the 
Khmer Rouge remnants fighting from the jungles of western Cambodia after the Vietnamese forces 
had thrown them out of the capital in 1979, it was the only one that kept a close political relationship 
with Pol Pot’s group, supplying considerable amounts of weapons and funds to the Khmer Rouge both 
before and after 1979. Kaing Khek Eav, or Duch, who went on trial in 2009 for torturing and murdering 
14,000 people in Tuol Sleng prison during Khmer Rouge rule, spent a year in China in the mid-1980s. 
Pol Pot himself spent two years there, ostensibly for medical treatment. 
1  The text is amended from Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750, published by 
Basic Books earlier this year.
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Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia in 1989, as the 
Cold War was coming to a close, but the terror of the 
Khmer Rouge continued up to the movement’s self-
destruction in 1997, when Pol Pot killed his second-in-
command and then either died or was killed himself. 
In the meantime, Cambodia could begin its slow 
journey back from the nightmare it had experienced.
Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War had a deep 
impact on the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. With 
the Soviet collapse and with the war in Cambodia 
won by the Vietnamese (although at a terrible 
cost), both Hanoi and Beijing were eager to find a 
modus vivendi. As China’s economy expanded, the 
Vietnamese Communist leaders became convinced 
that Vietnam had to reform its own economic sector. 
By the early 2000s, much inspired by the Chinese 
example, Hanoi had transformed its sluggish planned 
economy in a market-led expansion that in relative 
terms in Asia was second only to that of its northern 
neighbour. But the worries the Vietnamese leaders 
had over what they saw as Chinese attempts at 
controlling their country did not abate, and they 
were wary of Chinese investment, including that by 
returning Sino-Vietnamese who had fled during the 
war. Even so, China has become Vietnam’s largest 
trading partner, and all forms of economic exchanges 
are increasing rapidly.
Despite good economic links and decent overall 
bilateral relations, some of the Sino-Vietnamese 
tension that we have seen through history continues 
today. Hanoi is particularly concerned over China’s 
territorial claims in the South China Sea. This is a 
conflict that is threatening to overshadow much of 
China’s relations with its neighbours to the south. 
But for Vietnam, having fought a recent war with 
China, these claims have a direct security relevance 
as well as economic implications. If Vietnam accepted 
the Chinese position, even in part, then almost all 
of its coast would be alongside waters controlled 
by the Chinese navy. It would also, many in Hanoi 
believe, be left out of the exploration of rich natural 
resources under the seabed and rich fisheries in the 
sea above. Having joined the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations in 1995 and dramatically improved 
its relations with the United States, Australia, and 
Japan, Vietnam is trying to multilateralise the issue, 
in order to balance China’s growing power. China, on 
its side, is worried that Vietnam is spurning its offers 
of friendship and cooperation and that the country 
might become a cornerstone in a US-led containment 
policy toward China.
China has come a long way in normalising its relations 
with what is probably, in the long term, its most 
important neighbour in the region. But issues from 
history stand in the way of a full partnership. Still 
led by two communist parties, the two countries go 
through frequent spats over historical issues. Both set 
of leaders insist that the other should censor nationalist 
sentiments on Internet sites or blogs. At the heart of 
the matter is the view, never completely forgotten 
in Beijing or Hanoi, that China is the central state 
in the region, and therefore expects, or demands, 
subservience by others. The Sino-Vietnamese 
agreement on the exact land borders between the 
two countries, signed in 1999, took ten years to 
implement amid accusations that both sides were 
moving century-old border markers in the dead of 
the night to gain advantage. It will not be easy for 
the two to achieve a balanced relationship.
FORGING LINKS
The foreign policy that China’s late leader Deng 
Xiaoping formed focused on forging closer links 
with Southeast Asia. The region is full of Chinese 
migrants who have done well as well as companies 
and individuals who could contribute to China’s 
modernisation through trade and investment. Deng 
thought their involvement in the PRC would be 
less politically problematic than that of Americans, 
Japanese, and Koreans. The problem Deng’s China 
faced was that most Southeast Asian states had 
leaders who saw China as a threat. They feared the 
political influence of the Chinese minorities in their 
own countries, and they resented the PRC because 
for almost a generation it had sponsored communist 
parties opposed to their governments. In countries like 
Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines, China 
had supplied communist-led guerrillas with money, 
weapons, and training to carry on civil wars. It was 
not an ideal starting point for opening up relations 
with the existing regimes.
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In more ways than one, China got very lucky in its 
attempts to reach out to old elites in Southeast Asia. 
It could benefit from contacts with the Huaqiao, the 
Southeast Asian Chinese. Some of these connections 
had not even been broken during the Cultural 
Revolution. China could also build on the general 
assumption among the wealthy in the region that 
China would be a gigantic market for Southeast Asian 
goods if they could get in before other and more 
powerful foreigners were able to establish themselves 
there. From the early 1980s on, very much driven by 
the Chinese diaspora, Southeast Asian companies 
became a significant presence in China. Some of 
them, such as Thailand’s Charoen Pokphand (Zheng 
Dai in Chinese), are now among the largest foreign 
investors there. The Vietnamese overthrow of the Pol 
Pot regime in Cambodia in 1979 also helped China 
in this regard. The PRC could stand as a de facto ally 
of the conservative Southeast Asian regimes against 
what they feared would be Vietnamese and Soviet 
attempts at controlling the whole region. Singapore’s 
anti-communist leader, Lee Kuan Yew, told Western 
visitors that ‘if the Chinese had not punished Vietnam, 
all of Southeast Asia would have been open to Soviet 
influence. Now it has gained 10 to 15 years. The Thai 
premier, for instance, is a new and relaxed man after 
the Chinese punitive expedition.’ China’s attempts at 
‘teaching Hanoi a lesson’ may have been a disaster 
from a Chinese military perspective, but the stunned 
praise it brought Beijing from countries further south 
gave Deng time to quietly shelve his country’s support 
for communist insurgencies outside its own borders.
As a Chinese-majority state and the most dynamic 
economy in Southeast Asia, Singapore has played a 
particularly important role for China. Deng Xiaoing 
visited there in 1978, in his first foreign visit after 
having retaken the reins of power in Beijing. Deng, 
the proponent of ‘muscular growth’ as he called it, 
was most impressed with what he saw. Deng had 
last visited Singapore in 1920, when it was a colonial 
backwater where the Chinese existed to do the work 
for British authorities. By the late 1970s Singapore was 
a powerhouse. It was in most respects everything Deng 
wanted China to become. After returning to Beijing, 
Deng stressed the need to learn from Singapore’s social 
order and stability, from its economic versatility, and 
from the role the government had in promoting and 
steering growth. For three generations of Chinese 
Communists, Singapore had been everything there 
was reason to hate: capitalism, class oppression, and 
closeness to the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s 
it became an object of emulation, especially as social 
and political unrest in 1989 threatened to derail Deng’s 
plans. It also became an economic partner. Singapore 
is now the fifth largest investor in China and a primary 
conduit for the import of technology, including 
forms of technology that China finds it difficult 
to obtain elsewhere.
Lee Kuan Yew, the Singaporean leader, taught the 
new Chinese leadership much about the region he 
operated in. By the 1990s he stressed the importance 
of the regional organisation, ASEAN. Originally set 
up in 1967 as a framework for cooperation among 
anti-communist governments, ASEAN soon took on 
a much broader significance in terms of regional 
integration. After the Cold War it began a set of 
ambitious programs for deepening cooperation among 
member states. And it added new members: Vietnam 
in 1995, Burma and Laos in 1997, and Cambodia in 
1999. Today’s ASEAN states, which together have 
almost 600 million people in them, are aiming for an 
economic community not unlike the European Union.
For China the emergence of ASEAN was both a threat 
and an opportunity. Lee and other Southeast Asian 
leaders were at first told that China preferred to deal 
with individual states, not regional organisations. Then, 
as it became clear that ASEAN would not accept a 
divide-and-rule approach and that the organisation was 
an increasingly integrated force for regional stability, 
the Chinese government changed tack. Since the late 
1990s, cooperation between China and ASEAN has 
gone from strength to strength, with real practical 
progress underlying the often fuzzy language about 
Asian values and common heritage. On economic 
issues, the big northern neighbour has come to be 
seen more as a partner than a threat through a number 
of new formal and informal mechanisms. China’s 
support for regional currencies during the economic 
crisis in 1997-1998 convinced even those who had 
been critical of Chinese policies in the past that 
Beijing now had no interest in economic dislocation to 
its south. An ASEAN-China Free Trade Area came into 
force in 2010, but there are still difficulties in the trade 
relationship that need to be sorted out.
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SECURITY PERCEPTIONS
As we have seen in the case of Vietnam, now a key 
member of ASEAN, institutional cooperation does 
not always translate into security perceptions. If one 
speaks with leaders from the Southeast Asia region, 
the overarching problem of living next to a giant 
is always present, in all its facets. In broad outline, 
the relationship is not unlike the one between the 
United States and Latin America. But China’s southern 
neighbours are, relatively speaking, far more powerful 
than those of the United States, not least because they 
are better organised. Uncertainties over who will be 
in a position to develop the resources that border the 
Southeast Asian region create mutual suspicions and 
potential conflict. ASEAN countries are for instance 
worried about Chinese links with Myanmar, a resource-
rich member state that is, despite the recent opening-
up, still run by a particularly incompetent military 
dictatorship. The regional organisation has been 
pushing for reform in Myanmar, while China has 
seemed happy with status quo.
But first and foremost the main ASEAN members 
are concerned over Beijing’s claims to most of the 
small islands within the South China Sea. This vast 
maritime area holds immense riches – oil, gas, and 
mineral ores – and both the ASEAN countries and 
China want to develop it. These waters also contain 
the world’s busiest commercial sea lanes. China and 
Vietnam have already clashed over ownership of some 
of the islets, with China occupying nine of the Spratly 
Islands, over which Vietnam also claims sovereignty. 
Now other ASEAN states are getting increasingly 
concerned about China’s motives and its actions. 
Chinese maps show Scarborough Shoal, about 120 
miles from Subic Bay in the Philippines, as Chinese 
territory, and claim reefs as far south as thirty miles 
off the coast of Borneo, all in the name of ‘historical 
rights’. From 2010 some ASEAN members have leaned 
heavily toward internationalising the issue, seeking 
support from the United States and other powers, 
such as India. All such attempts in the past have met 
with a stern reaction from Beijing, which has now 
begun speaking of the South China Sea as a Chinese 
‘core interest’. 
 
There is obviously much that still can go wrong in 
the Sino-ASEAN relationship, in spite of a hopeful 
beginning. Within ASEAN, the biggest economy and 
the most powerful military are both Indonesian. With 
a rapidly growing population of close to 250 million 
people, Indonesia has now become the key power 
in the region, and its relationship with China has 
not always been easy. The CCP had supported the 
Indonesian Communist Party, which was crushed in 
a military crackdown in 1965. In the massacres that 
followed the military takeover, Chinese-Indonesian 
communities were targeted and thousands of 
innocent people killed. The Indonesian constitution 
contained anti-Chinese restrictions all the way up to 
the reintroduction of democracy in 1998. People of 
Chinese ancestry are still underrepresented in politics 
and military affairs but massively overrepresented in 
business; it is often said that Chinese-Indonesians 
control up to two-thirds of the Indonesian private 
economy. There is much uncertainty in the relationship 
between Beijing and Jakarta, although the two are 
working together within an ASEAN framework.
The contradictory form of the Sino-Indonesian 
relationship came to the fore in 1998, a year many 
Indonesians celebrate as the beginning of their 
country’s democracy. As the strongly anti-communist 
Suharto dictatorship ended, Indonesians of Chinese 
descent were attacked in many parts of the country 
by mobs that accused them of amassing illicit wealth 
during the dictator’s rule. For older Chinese, who had 
had relatives killed thirty years before by the dictator’s 
forces on suspicion of being communists, the wanton 
murders and rapes in 1998 were signs that if you were 
of Chinese descent in Indonesia you were in constant 
danger whatever you did. One report described the 
ordeal of a Sino-Indonesian family who ran a little 
corner store in a suburb of Jakarta: ‘Among the looters 
were people known to the family, including the local 
meatball seller, who made off with a television set. 
Others stole the photo-copier from the store and 
then later tried to sell it back to the family for a 
high price. A year after the attack the family were 
operating their store again, supplying basic goods 
to the neighbourhood.’ Unlike after 1965, the PRC 
government’s reaction was measured. It stressed that 
Sino-Indonesians were, above all, Indonesian citizens 
who should be protected by their own government. 
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Student protests in Beijing were quelled by the 
authorities, who wanted a good relationship with 
the post-Suharto regime in Indonesia.
China’s fear today is that Indonesia, and Southeast 
Asian states more generally, will increase their 
cooperation with the United States as a result of 
Beijing’s economic rise and more powerful international 
position. Military and diplomatic planners whom I have 
spoken with see such a development as quite likely. 
The United States had a close strategic relationship 
with Indonesia during the Suharto dictatorship from 
1965 to 1998, and most of the Indonesian leaders 
are oriented toward the United States culturally and 
educationally. They are also aware of the positive 
impact in the country of President Barack Obama 
having spent four years there as a child. Beijing is 
trying to use its new economic muscle to be seen by 
Jakarta as an equal of the United States. Right before 
Obama’s first visit to Jakarta as president in 2010, 
China offered investments of $6.6 billion in desperately 
needed infrastructure improvements. But such forms 
of economic cooperation are just turning the existing 
situation around very slowly, especially as the United 
States is rebalancing to focus on the region with the 
ending of its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The South China Sea issue is less of an immediate 
concern to Indonesia than to some of the other 
ASEAN members, but Jakarta has made a point of 
full ASEAN solidarity on the matter. Unfortunately for 
both countries, especially in the longer run, China’s 
ocean claims overlap with Indonesia’s economic zone 
in one area, which happens to be part of the world’s 
largest gas field off the Natuna Islands. The Indonesian 
government has reacted very negatively to what it sees 
at Chinese attempts at intimidating its neighbours. 
When some ASEAN states tried to raise Law of the 
Sea concerns at the ASEAN regional forum meeting 
in 2010, the Chinese foreign minister reminded his 
counterparts very sharply about the difference in size 
between China and its southern neighbours. The 
Indonesians will not have it; a former top foreign 
policy maker told me afterwards that ‘Indonesia is a 
serious country that will not be bullied’.
Not surprising, then, that the Indonesian armed forces 
in 2009 carried out a joint exercise with the United 
States, code-named Garuda Shield. They, and other 
ASEAN militaries, stress that they believe a US presence 
in the region is needed in order to balance the growing 
power of China. The Indonesians have also sought 
closer relations with India, China’s rival further west. 
China’s response has been halting. Most Chinese 
leaders believe that a gradual and measured approach 
to Southeast Asia, combined with China’s rising 
economic power, will prevent great power rivalries 
in the region. They tend to stress China’s historical 
ties to the area, and their peaceful development over 
a long period of time. But Beijing is in no mood to 
barter away what it sees as Chinese rights in return 
for a stable relationship. In 2010 China held its biggest 
naval exercises ever in the South China Sea, with ships 
from all three main Chinese fleets participating. For 
the first time since the fifteenth century, China has a 
predominant naval presence in the southern seas.  ■
